As Washington still saw, its main purpose was, “. . . eliminating or modifying existing barriers (legal, contractual or otherwise) to the expansion of U.S. foreign oil activities and to facilitating the entry or reintroduction of foreign private capital in countries where the absence of such capital hinders the development of oil. Such “capital” meant U.S. capital, which specifically required that diplomatic commitments pave the way for American companies: “That the policy and techniques of diplomatic and other support, applied so far by the U.S. government, be pursued and strengthened where appropriate and possible,” and that Washington . . .
. 2000, 1990, 1990, 1996, 1 “the arrival of other U.S. companies at all stages of foreign oil activity.” This would require closer coordination with U.S. companies, but also with foreign governments, which would be encouraged to pass laws.” adequately protect the legitimate interests of all parties involved. And this in turn meant that “the Committee certainly has a sovereign right to nationalize its industries, but it is not followed that a country should exercise this right and felt that all viable methods of persuasion should be used to induce a country that was considering the nationalization of its oil industry to refrain from such nationalization.” . (16) According to policy, the United States would not borrow public funds for the development of the nationalized oil industry and would naturally continue diplomatic interventions. 30 In response to the oil agreements, see John A. Loftus Memorandum for the Secretary`s Staff Committee, “Proposed inter-company arrangements affecting Middle East oil,” 14 February 1947, NA, RG 59, 890F6363/2-1447; Paul Nitze to Will Clayton, February 21, 1947, NA, RG 59, 800.6363/2-2147.
Regarding the efforts of the departments to promote a more competitive agreement, see Memorandum Meeting between Nitze, Loftus, Robertson and Eakens and Orville Harden and B. Brewster Jennings, March 7, 1947, FRUS (1947), V, 651-654. To officially support the company`s efforts to cancel the Red Line Agreement, see Secretary of State to Gallman, November 29, 1946, FRUS (1946), VII, 39; Loftus Memorandum Conversation with Orville Harden, Harold Sheets, and B. Brewster Jennings, January 9, 1947, FRUS (1947), V, 630-631. Regarding persistent concerns about cartels and abuse of dominance, see Kaufman, Burton I., “Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: the 1950s,” Journal of American History (March 1977), 937-959.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Several studies found that in the early 1920s, the United States has considered an agreement with Britain to ensure an open door for American companies to compete with oil concessions in the Middle East: Until recently, however, no one was able to find a copy. (2) In 2010, when conducting ph.D. oil research and great strategy, I found what appears to be the only surviving copy in the State Department`s Central Control Files (Record Group 59) at the National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland. The document and its cover sheet do not contain a standard decimal number, but they are attached to the State Department`s 1910-1929 U.S. Home Affairs files, particularly with respect to oil.