Applicability of the Agreement: The Agreement applies only to “a person who has served a sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary or penitentiary establishment” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)) and therefore does not apply to a person awaiting trial. See United States vs. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9th Cir.), certificate refused, 449 U.p. 880 (1980); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977).
Since the agreement only applies to a prisoner based on a pending “indictment, information or complaint” requiring a “procedure” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)), the agreement does not apply to a prisoner based on a probation warrant. See Reed, above. The procedure for the order of prisoners for a suspended offence is set at 18 U.S.C 4214 (b). The agreement also does not apply to probation criminals. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.p. 716 (1985). The agreement also provides that when a prisoner applies for an order in a case for which a prisoner has been filed, it is a request for a decision on all matters for which prisoners have been filed by the same “[S]tate”. Article III(d) In this context, the different federal districts have been separately designated as `[S]tates`.
See United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1979), certificate refused, 446 U.p. 920 (1980). Prosecution of other charges that have not been the subject of any prisoner is not permitted by the agreement unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] It is not clear whether the examination of the latter is compulsory. If the U.S. attorney brings the Article IV motion, the indictment on which the motion is based must be completely eliminated before the prisoner returns (including all trials and convictions, according to some courts). If this is not the case, the accusation shall be rejected by prejudice, unless notification and a possibility of hearing are provided for in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Treaty. (Article IV(e)) In this context, the different federal districts were treated as separate states. See United States v. Woods, 621 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.), cert.
Denied, 449 U.p. 877 (1980). Other charges cannot be pursued at the same time, unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] Again, it is not clear whether testing the latter is mandatory or only allowed. In addition, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 requires 18 U.S.C. 3161 (j) that a U.S. attorney who knows that an accused is serving a sentence in a penal institution must immediately request the presence of the accused for trial or proceed with the detention of a prisoner. If the prisoner requests a trial and is made available for criminal prosecution, the speedy Trial Act time limits apply, but do not begin to run “until the accused is actually present for the purposes of the plea”.
See H.R.Rep. . .